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Abstract 
No previous study has simultaneously examined body ownership and agency in 
healthy subjects during mirror self-observation. We used a moving rubber hand 
illusion to examine how both body ownership and agency are affected by seeing (i) 
the body moving in a mirror, compared with (ii) directly viewing the moving hand, 
and (iii) seeing a visually identical hand rotated by 180°. We elicited ownership of the 
hand using direct visual feedback, finding this effect was further enhanced when 
looking at the hand in a mirror, whereas rotating the hand 180° abolished ownership. 
Agency was similarly elicited using direct visual feedback, and equally so in the 
mirror, but again reduced for the 180° hand. We conclude that the reflected body in a 
mirror is treated as ‘special’ in the mind, and distinct from other external objects. This 
enables bodies and actions viewed in a mirror to be directly related to the self. 
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1. Introduction 
What happens when we look in a mirror?1 In a basic, physical sense, looking in a 
mirror provides a simple tool for observing one’s outer appearance by reflecting light 
according to geometric rules (Prinz, 2013). Humans are one of only a few animals 
who can recognise themselves in a mirror, and as such mirror self-recognition is 
regarded as a litmus test of self-awareness (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970; Plotnik, 
de Waal, & Reiss, 2006; Reiss, & Marino, 2001). However, we do not use mirrors to 
just passively recognise ourselves; we regularly perform complex, mirror-guided 
actions such as shaving, applying make-up, and brushing our teeth.  We are able to 
perform these intricate actions without consideration, or even awareness, of the many 
unique properties of mirror images (see Bertamini & Parks, 2005; Bianchi, Savardi, & 
Bertamini, 2008; Lawson & Bertamini, 2006) and thus the motor transformations 
required. 
In cognitive neuroscience terms, the self that we experience when moving in 
front of a mirror comprises both a sense of body ownership (i.e. the sense that one’s 
body belongs to oneself) and agency (i.e. the sense that one is the cause or author of 
one’s actions). An abundance of recent research has sought to understand the 
functional and neuroanatomical mechanisms underlying these fundamental aspects of 
the self (e.g. Farrer et al., 2003; Jenkinson et al., 2013; Jenkinson, Edelstyn, Preston, 
& Ellis, 2014; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Newport & Preston, 2010; Tsakiris, Prabhu, 
& Haggard, 2006). However, only a handful of experimental studies have specifically 
sought to examine the effect of mirror self-observation on body ownership in healthy 
individuals (see Bertamini, Berselli, Bode, Lawson, & Wong, 2011; Jenkinson et al., 
                                                
1 References to looking in the mirror and mirror reflections through this paper refer to 
the image produced by a frontally positioned mirror, which is distinct from other 
research looking at the effect of placing a mirror in the sagittal position 
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2013; Kontaris & Downing, 2011), and no study to date has examined the effect of 
mirror self-observation on agency.  
Bertamini et al. (2011) conducted the now classic rubber hand illusion (RHI; 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), but with the rubber hand observed only in a mirror. They 
found that a mirror view of the rubber hand elicited strong embodiment, as measured 
using subjective ratings and perceived drift in location of the real hand towards the 
rubber hand (i.e. proprioceptive drift). Jenkinson et al. (2013) replicated and extended 
this effect, finding that the RHI was elicited (as measured using questionnaire ratings), 
irrespective of whether vision and attention were focused on a directly observed 
rubber hand, or the specular image of the rubber hand in the mirror. Importantly, in 
these studies ownership during the mirror RHI was equal to that induced by direct 
view (but see Kontaris & Downing, 2011), which contrasts with the finding that 
ownership is not elicited when the rubber hand is rotated by 180-degrees and placed 
in the same location as the specular image (such that the visual properties are identical 
to that of the mirror condition; see Bertamini et al., 2011; and Kontaris & Dowling, 
2011). These findings show how a strong sense of ownership is experienced when 
seeing our body in a mirror, and support the unique representation of mirror 
reflections in the mind. 
However, the question of how agency is affected by looking in a mirror has 
never been specifically and directly examined. A case report of immediate, complete 
and permanent remission of chronic anosognosia for hemiplegia (i.e. unawareness of 
paralysis) following video-feedback provides striking evidence of the possible effect 
that viewing the body from a third-person perspective (similar to that produced from 
looking in a mirror) can have on (disturbed) agency (Fotopoulou, Rudd, Holmes, & 
Kopelman, 2009). However, the mechanism by which this dramatic effect was 
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obtained is unclear, with the change in awareness potentially arising as a result of 
viewing the body ‘from the outside’, from observing motor performance ‘offline’ (i.e. 
when there was no intention to perform a movement), or from a combination of these 
two factors.  
Importantly, both agency and perspective taking have been proposed as 
critical components of self-consciousness (Vogeley & Fink, 2003); however, there 
has been little attempt to investigate the interaction of these two factors in healthy 
individuals (see David et al., 2006, for an exception). The third-person/observer view 
of our body (such as that provided by mirror and video feedback) may be important 
for the sense of agency, given that the ability to discriminate between self and other 
actions allows us not only to recognise ourselves and guide our own actions, but also 
to interpret the actions of others (Preston & Newport, 2010). Alternatively, 
controlling the body in the mirror may be more similar to using a tool, and so distinct 
from feelings of agency over the actual body (i.e. external vs. body agency; see 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012).  
Owing to the absence of any existing experimental evidence, this study 
specifically set out to examine the effect of mirror self-observation on agency, whilst 
also attempting to replicate existing findings concerning body ownership. We used an 
existing method: the moving rubber hand illusion (mRHI; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 
2014a, 2014b), during which participants observe movements of a model hand while 
their own hand is hidden from view. The model hand can be moved either actively 
(under the control of the participant) or passively (under the control of the 
experimenter), with the movements made by the model and real hand being either 
synchronous or asynchronous. Using this method, Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) found 
that asynchronous movement or rotating the model hand by 180 degrees abolished the 
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illusion of ownership, and that ownership was higher during active compared with 
passive synchronous movements. Agency, on the other hand, was still experienced 
even for an anatomically impossible, rotated hand. Extending this method to the 
current experiment, healthy participants performed the mRHI whilst looking at a 
model hand either directly, rotated 180 degrees, or via a mirror. We expected results 
of the directly viewed and rotated conditions to replicate those of Kalckert and 
Ehrsson (2012), as described above. We expected that, in the mirror, ownership and 
agency would be greater during synchronous as compared with asynchronous 
movement, and active as compared with passive movement overall. In addition, we 
predicted that synchronous movements observed in the mirror would produce body 
ownership equal to that of directly observed movements (see Bertamini et al., 2011; 
Jenkinson et al., 2013), whereas a 180° view would abolish ownership. For agency in 
the mirror, we expected only active and synchronous movement to elicit a sense of 
agency, and for all three views to produce the same effect (based on the previous 
finding that a 180° view does not abolish agency).  
We measured the illusion using both subjective (embodiment questionnaire) 
and objective (proprioceptive drift) measures. In addition to drift in the perceived 
height of the real hand towards the model hand (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a, 
2014b; hereafter referred to as "height drift") we also measured drift away from the 
body / towards the mirror (hereafter referred to as “forward drift”). Objects viewed in 
a mirror are treated as being located in peripersonal space, despite the image 
appearing in extrapersonal space (Maravita, Spence, Clarke, Husain, & Driver, 2000). 
Therefore, we predicted that despite the projected image being distant from the body 
(in extrapersonal space), the hand would still be perceived as located in peripersonal 
space. We therefore expected that the above predictions would be demonstrated via 
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changes in height drift and subjective ratings, whereas the forward drift would show 
no difference across conditions, and was used as a control for demand characteristics 




Thirty-two healthy volunteers (11 male, 21 female; mean age = 23.50, SD = 4.36; 
range = 18-32 years) from the University of Hertfordshire participated in the 
experiment. All participants were right-hand dominant (Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory; Oldfield, 1971) and naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The study was 
approved by an institutional research ethics committee and all participants provided 
written informed consent.  
 
2.2. Design 
The experiment assessed whether Synchrony, Movement type and View influence 
ownership and agency of the hand. Synchrony between the movements of the real and 
model hand was manipulated so that movements were either temporally congruent (i.e. 
no delay between real and model hand movement) or incongruent (i.e. delayed) by 
approximately 500ms. Movement type was manipulated so that movements of the two 
hands were either self-generated by the participant (i.e. active) or generated by the 
experimenter (i.e. passive). Finally, View was manipulated so that participants were 
provided with either (i) a direct view of the rubber hand in the canonical position with 
fingers pointing away from the participant’s body, (ii) a view of the hand rotated 180°, 
with fingers pointing towards the participant’s body, or (iii) a view of the (canonically 
positioned) hand via a mirror (creating visual feedback of the hand with fingers 
pointing towards the participant). The experiment therefore had a 2 (Synchrony: 
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synchronous vs. asynchronous) x 2 (Movement type: active vs. passive) x 3 (View: 
direct vs. 180° vs. mirror) design. A fully-factorial combination of these three factors 
produced the 12 conditions summarised in Table 1. Conditions were completed 
within-subject in a random order. 
 
2.3. Materials and set-up 
The experimental materials and set-up replicated an established moving rubber hand 
illusion method (see Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a, 2014b), with minor 
modifications to accommodate the mirror conditions (see Design and Procedure). The 
experiment involved a 16cm (h) x 30cm (w) x 45cm (d) box positioned on a table 
immediately in front of the participant, in alignment with the sagittal body midline 
(see Figure 1a-c). A model (wooden) artist hand (measuring 30.5cm from tip of the 
middle finger to the base of the wrist) with articulated joints was placed with the palm 
faced down on top of the box either in a canonical (anatomically congruent) position, 
or rotated by 180° (anatomically incongruent). During the mirror conditions direct 
view of the model hand (placed in the canonical position) was obscured by 
positioning a piece of cardboard between the model hand and participant’s face, and a 
40cm (h) x 30cm (w) single plane mirror was placed on the box in front of the 
participant at the point where the fingertips of the model hand ended. The mirror was 
positioned such that it provided an image identical to that of the 180° condition, with 
only the model hand (and not the face of the participant) observable in the mirror. 
This was achieved by covering the top half of the mirror with a sheet of plane white 
paper and rotating the angle of the mirror until the participant report being able to see 
only the model hand. A right model hand was used during the direct and mirror view 
conditions, whereas a left hand was used during the 180° conditions, in order to create 
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visual feedback matching that of the mirror condition (i.e. a mirror changes an object 
into its enantiomorph, so a virtual [mirror] image of a right hand appears as if it is a 
left hand). The participant’s own right hand was located directly below the model 
hand in a relaxed, slightly curled position. White cotton gloves were placed on the 
model hand and worn on the participant’s right hand throughout the experiment in 
order to control for differences in visual and tactile feedback that might influence the 
illusion. Participants also wore a dark-coloured cape around their neck, which covered 
the right side of their body and the distal end of the model hand so that it appear to be 
an extension of the participant’s own right arm. Movement of the model hand was 
achieved by a thin wooden dowel, one end of which could be attached to the index 
finger of the model hand via a removable plastic ring (when required; see Procedure). 
The dowel extended into the box so that the other end of the dowel could be attached 
to the participant’s right index finger with an identical plastic clip (when required; see 
procedure). An opening on the left side of the box allowed the experimenter (but not 
the participant) to observe the real hand and dowel mechanism, in order to attach / 
detach the dowel from the finger and control / monitor movements of the two hands 
as required by the various experimental conditions (see Design and Procedure). 
Previous research using this set-up indicates that participants typically do not develop 
explicit awareness of the mechanism used to produce the observed movements (see 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, p.4). The participant’s left hand was located in a resting 
position with the palm facing down on the table throughout the experiment. 
 
2.4. Illusion measures 
2.4.1. mRHI Questionnaire  
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To assess the subjective experiences of agency and ownership we used the short form 
of the mRHI questionnaire from Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012). The questionnaire (see 
supplementary materials) contained two statements to assess ownership (i.e. “related 
to the experience of perceiving the hand as the ‘own’ hand”; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2014a, p. 120) and two statements measuring agency (i.e. “related to the experience of 
voluntary control”; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a, p. 120). A further four statements (2 
ownership control and 2 agency control), resembled the illusion-specific statements in 
wording but did not capture the phenomenological experience of agency or ownership. 
These served as controls for compliance, suggestibility, and expectancy effects (see 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012 & 2014a for details). During the experiment each statement 
was presented in a pseudorandom order on each occasion, and rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale (-3 = totally disagree, 0 = uncertain, +3 = totally agree). A visual version 
of the Likert scale (printed on A4 paper) accompanied the verbal presentation of each 
statement, and was used to facilitate responses where necessary. 
 
2.4.2. Proprioceptive drift 
An objective, behavioural measure of the illusion was also obtained by assessing the 
degree to which the perceived position of the right index finger shifted towards the 
model hand during each condition (i.e. drift towards the model hand). Proprioceptive 
drift is a well-established method of assessing ownership of the foreign limb (see 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), which is unrelated to 
subjective agency ratings (see Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Following the procedure of 
Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012, 2014a, 2014b), participants indicated (with their eyes 
closed) the felt location of their right index finger by using their left index finger to 
rapidly but accurately point towards a piece of graph paper attached to the left side of 
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the experimental apparatus. The experimenter marked on the graph paper the position 
of the fingertip (rounded to the nearest cm), allowing the perceived height, and 
distance of the hand from the body to be measured. We measured drift in height 
instead of the more conventional (horizontal plane) proprioceptive drift (see 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), because the real and model hands were positioned in the 
same location horizontally, thereby eliminating the possibility of any such drift. This 
method may also have an advantage over the traditional horizontal measurement as it 
avoids the capturing effect of the body, which may enhance drift scores in the 
traditional horizontal plane (Preston, 2013).  In addition, we measured the extent to 
which the perceived position of the right index shifted forward, away from the real 
body and towards the mirror (i.e. forward drift). This served as a control for general 
compliance, suggestibility, and expectancy effects relating to proprioceptive drift; that 
is, since objects viewed in a mirror are processed as being located in (peri)personal 
space (see Maravita et al., 2000), there should be no forward (or backward) drift. 
The perceived location of the right index finger was measured pre- and post- 
induction in each condition, and drift was calculated by subtracting the pre-induction 
point from the post-induction point. A positive value for the height drift indicated a 
shift in the perceived location of the real hand towards the model hand. A positive 
value for the forward drift indicated a shift towards the mirror / away from the body 
and location of the real hand. 
 
2.5. Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet study room at the University of 
Hertfordshire and took approximately 1.5 hours to complete. Prior to commencing the 
first experimental condition participants were familiarised with the proprioceptive 
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drift procedure (see above), Likert scale used to measure the illusion (i.e. an 
explanation of the scale was given and understanding of the scale checked), and 
tapping movement they would be asked to perform during the experiment. The 
tapping movement comprised flexion and extension of the right index finger 
(magnitude of finger lift ~6cm) at a rate of 1Hz. Participants were instructed to avoid 
a strictly regular pattern by including a quick double-tap at non-regular (jittered) 
intervals; this procedure is reported to enhance the strength of the illusion (Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2012; 2014a), and compliance was checked in a pre-experimental training 
period, during which the experimenter observed the participant’s tapping movement, 
corrected mistakes (e.g. if the participant adopted a regular tapping pattern), and 
demonstrated if necessary. A metronome was used to aid timing during training, but 
was not present during the actual experimental conditions. 
 During each condition the experimenter sat on the left side of the participant, 
allowing access to the open side of the experimental box. At the start of the condition 
the model hand (positioned either canonically or 180° rotated), and mirror (where 
applicable) were put into position on top of the box, and the real hand placed inside 
the box (see section 2.2 and table 1). The participant then viewed the model hand for 
30s (to control for embodiment as a result of visual capture; see Pavani, Spence, & 
Driver, 2000) before completing the pre-induction (pointing) measure of 
proprioceptive drift. Induction of the illusion was then implemented as described 
below. In all cases participants viewed the model hand without view of their own 
right hand or the experimenter’s hand. 
In the active conditions the participant was instructed to self-generate the 
practiced tapping movement for 60s. In passive movement conditions the participant 
was instructed to relax their hand and the experimenter moved the real and model 
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hand for 60s. For synchronous conditions the real and model hand were connected via 
the wooden dowel and finger clips so that movement of the two hands were 
temporally congruent. During asynchronous conditions the finger clip worn on the 
real hand was detached from the wooden dowel; however, the clip remained on the 
participant’s finger to maintain consistent somatosensory feedback across all 
conditions. The experimenter then used the dowel inside the box to move the model 
hand (and real hand in passive conditions) in a way that mimicked movements of the 
actual hand but with a temporal delay of ~500ms. 
Immediately after the 60s movement period participants completed the second 
(post-induction) pointing measure of proprioceptive drift, followed by the mRHI 
questionnaire. A rest period of at least 45s occurred between each condition, during 
which the participant was instructed to remove his or her hand from the box and 
encouraged to flex the fingers and shake the wrist to abolish the previous illusion 
induction. Following completion of all conditions the participant was thanked, 
debriefed, and dismissed. 
 
2.6. Data handling and analysis 
Subjective measures of agency and ownership were calculated by averaging 
the two agency statements and separately the two ownership statements to produce 
composite measures of agency and ownership. The control agency and control 
ownership statements were likewise averaged to produce composite measures of 
agency control and ownership control. These composite scores were used in 
subsequent analyses. Our objective measure of ownership (proprioceptive drift) was 
calculated as outlined above (section 2.4.2). For clarity, in the results below we first 
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report our findings regarding the ownership questionnaire and proprioceptive drift, 
and then our agency findings. 
For our statistical analysis we examined each condition’s questionnaire and 
drift data for normality (via visual inspection of histograms, and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests), which was violated in the majority of cases (p 
< .05); therefore, non-parametric statistics were applied. In two preliminary checks 
(presented in supplementary materials for brevity) we examined the overall effect of 
Statement (illusion vs. control) (where applicable) and Synchrony (synchronous vs. 
asynchronous) on ownership, proprioceptive drift, and agency. We subsequently 
examined the main effects of Movement Type and View, and Movement Type x 
View interaction for each measure. All analyses were implemented using SPSS 
version 21, using Exact tests where possible. Reported p-values are 2-tailed and 




Table 2 summarises the illusion and control statement scores for ownership and 
agency in each condition. 
 
3.1. Ownership Ratings 
3.1.1. Main Effect of Movement type 
The overall effect of movement type was examined irrespective of visual perspective 
by conducting a Wilcoxon signed ranks test on the mean of all synchronous passive 
trials compared to all synchronous active trials. Participants reported significantly 
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higher ownership for active compared to passive movement (z = -4.12, p < .001; see 
Figure 2a).  
 
3.1.2. Main Effect of View 
The overall effect of view was examined by calculating the mean ownership score for 
each view (irrespective of movement type) and comparing these using a Friedman’s 
ANOVA. This revealed a significant difference between ownership ratings: χ2(2) = 
40.62, p < .001 (see Figure 2b). Post-hoc comparisons were carried out using 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests (Bonferroni-corrected critical α = .017). Mirror view was 
found to produce higher ownership scores than both direct (z = -3.34, p = .001) and 
180º (z = -4.70, p < .001) views. Direct view produced significantly higher ownership 
scores compared to 180º view (z = -4.75, p < .001). 
 
3.1.3. Movement type x View interaction 
To examine whether the effect of view is modulated by movement type, we calculated 
the difference between active and passive scores for each view and conducted a 
Friedman’s ANOVA on these differentials (see Hicks, 1973; Mead, 1988). Results of 
this analysis indicated no significant interaction between the two factors: χ2(2) = 5.08, 
p = .078.  
 
3.2. Proprioceptive drift 
Table 3 summarises the two measures of proprioceptive drift for each condition. 
 
3.2.1. Effect of Movement type 
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A Wilcoxon signed ranks test comparing the mean of all synchronous passive trials to 
all synchronous active trials, revealed significantly greater height drift for active 
movement (z = -4.09, p < .001; see Figure 2c). There was no significant difference in 
forward drift between active and passive movement (z = -1.23, p = .112). 
 
3.2.2. Effect of View 
A Friedman’s ANOVA comparing height drift across views (irrespective of 
movement type) revealed a significant effect, χ2(2) = 12.62, p = .001 (see Figure 2d). 
Subsequent pairwise comparisons (using Wilcoxon signed rank tests and a 
Bonferroni-corrected critical α = .017), showed less drift in height as a result of the 
180º view compared with both direct (z = -2.84, p = .005) and mirror (z = -3.18, p 
= .001) views. Direct and mirror views produced equivalent height drift (z = -1.92, p 
= .055). As expected, there was no effect of view on forward drift, χ2(2) = 1.71, p 
= .430. 
 
3.2.3. Movement type x View interaction 
A Friedman’s ANOVA on the active-passive differential scores of each view (as 
described in section 3.1.3 above) indicated no interaction between movement type and 
view on height drift, χ2(2) = 4.28, p = .116, or forward drift, χ2(2) = 2.00, p = .381. 
 
3.3. Agency Ratings 
3.3.1. Effect of Movement type 
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test, comparing the mean of all synchronous passive trials 
with all synchronous active trials, indicated significantly higher agency ratings during 
active movement (z = -4.86, p < .001; see Figure 3a). 
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3.3.2. Effect of View 
A Friedman’s ANOVA comparing agency ratings across views (irrespective of 
movement type), revealed a significant overall effect, χ2(2) = 22.66, p < .001 (see 
Figure 3b). Subsequent pairwise Wilcoxon signed ranks tests (Bonferroni-corrected α 
= .017), revealed that 180º view produced lower agency ratings compared with both 
direct (z = -3.53, p = .005) and mirror (z = -3.48, p = .001) views. There was no 
significant difference between direct and mirror views (z = -.68, p = .496). 
 
3.3.3. Movement type x View interaction 
A Friedman’s ANOVA on the active-passive differential scores of each view (as 
described in section 3.1.2. above) indicated a significant interaction between 
movement type and view: χ2(2) = 14.70, p < .001 (see Figure 3c).  To further break 
down this interaction we compared agency ratings between the direct, mirror, and 
180º view during active movement, and separately during passive movement (using 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests and a Bonferroni-corrected critical α = .008). Results 
indicated that the interaction arose as a result of differences in agency between views 
during active movement only, which were not present for passive moment. 
Specifically, for the active movements mirror and direct view produced significantly 
greater agency ratings compared with the 180º view (180º vs. mirror: z = -3.37, p 
=.001; and 180º vs. direct: z = -4.50, p <.001), while there was no significant 
difference between mirror and direct view ratings (z = -1.75, p =.08). There was no 
difference in agency ratings across views for passive movements (max z = -2.18, p 
=.03). 
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4. Discussion 
In this study we examined how both body ownership and agency are experienced in a 
mirror. With regards to body ownership, our results support our predictions and 
previous findings that ownership can be elicited whilst viewing the model hand via a 
mirror, but not when viewing the hand in a visually identical posture (180º rotation) 
without a mirror (Bertamini et al., 2011; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; 
Kontaris & Downing, 2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005), or when movements of the 
real and model hand are asynchronous (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Moreover, our 
unique investigation of agency in a mirror revealed that viewing (active synchronous) 
movements in a mirror elicits equally strong agency as when the model hand is seen 
directly. By contrast, viewing the hand rotated by 180º reduces (but does not abolish) 
agency (see Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012 for another example of this latter finding). 
These novel results suggest that when hand movements are observed in a mirror, they 
are processed in a similar way to movements of the actual body, as opposed to an 
external object. These findings suggest that mirrors are treated as ‘special’ in the mind, 
thereby enabling bodies and actions viewed in a mirror to be directly related to the 
self. 
 Interestingly, subjective reports of ownership were higher when looking at the 
hand in the mirror compared to directly. This finding is contrary to those of previous 
studies that found statistically equivalent (Bertamini et al., 2011; Jenkinson et al., 
2013) or reduced (Kontaris & Downing, 2011) ownership in a mirror; however, the 
observed enhancement of body ownership in the mirror is consistent with 
neuropsychological studies which find that mirror self-observation can reinstate body 
ownership in patients with somatoparaphrenia (Fotopoulou et al., 2011). How can we 
explain this enhancement effect? We consider two, possibly related factors that may 
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be important: firstly, we used a moving version of the rubber hand illusion in the 
current study, whereas previous research has examined body ownership in the mirror 
using only the classic (static) rubber hand illusion. Thus, body ownership might be 
enhanced during active movements because efferent motor signals may contribute to 
the feeling of ownership (discussed in more detail below). Furthermore, even during 
passive movements, the moving rubber hand illusion involves more possible channels 
of sensory information (e.g. cutaneous afferents, muscle spindle receptors and joint 
receptors), which are not engaged by tactile stimulation in the classic rubber hand 
illusion (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a). Despite such differences, the classic and 
moving rubber hand illusions have been found to elicit similarly strong feelings of 
ownership (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014a); however, in our study the mirror may have 
led certain signals to be considered more important than others, resulting in the 
observed enhancement of ownership.  
This differential weighting of certain sensorimotor signals might occur as a 
result of increased sensorimotor ‘noise’, or imprecision, created by discrepancies 
between the location of the felt and seen body when looking in the mirror (see 
Fotopoulou, 2014, for further discussion of the role played by sensorimotor noise in 
the construction of the bodily self). Existing research indicates that the specular image 
of the body seen in a mirror is treated as being located in peripersonal space (Maravita 
et al., 2000). Accordingly, if the hand in the mirror is treated as being in peripersonal 
space (as part of the body) as opposed to the position that it appears visually in space, 
then the brain must compute a transformation relating the events seen in the mirror to 
the position of the felt body. This transformation may introduce additional sensory 
noise, such that small discrepancies in hand appearance and location are less 
noticeable, or given less weight, when judging ownership. Feelings of ownership are 
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consequently increased in a mirror relative to direct view. Indeed, introducing noise to 
the visual feedback of reaches has been found to reduce discrepancy detection of self 
and other movements (Preston & Newport, 2014) and the introduction of a mirror 
may increase noise in a similar way.  
On the other hand, feelings of agency were not enhanced in the mirror view 
condition. This may be linked to the fact that during synchronous movement agency 
judgments were more binary in nature compared to ownership; synchronous active 
movement produced strong feelings of agency (median = +3) in both direct and 
mirror view, whereas synchronous passive movement showed the opposite extreme in 
responses. The proposed effect of the extra transformation from mirror view may, 
therefore, only be evident in conditions where there is more ambiguity or uncertainty 
in sensorimotor signals and consequently greater response variability. For example, 
asynchronous movement creates much greater conflict or noise between sensory and 
motor signals, and although significantly reducing feelings of agency, does not 
completely abolish agency (as does passive movement). Therefore, examining 
asynchronous conditions can eliminate the statistical issues involved with ceiling and 
floor effects that are apparent for the synchronous conditions. In fact, post hoc 
analysis of the asynchronous active conditions indicates that mirror view elicits 
significantly stronger agency compared to direct view (z = -2.64, p = .008), which 
further supports the facilitatory effect of viewing the hand in a mirror. However, the 
exact mechanisms underlying this effect, and why it is absent in previous mirror 
rubber hand illusion studies that do not have ceiling and floor effects, is unclear. 
Future research should therefore aim to replicate and directly examine the 
mechanisms behind enhanced illusion scores in a mirror. In particular, the role played 
by sensorimotor noise, and the contradictory findings that mirror self-observation can 
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both impair (Paysant et al., 2004) and improve body ownership (Fotopoulou et al., 
2011; Jenkinson et al., 2013) following brain injury deserve further attention.   
Our results also largely replicated those described by Kalckert and Ehrsson 
(2012), who demonstrated evidence for experimental double dissociation between 
agency and ownership. As well as agency and ownership being dissociable, however, 
they are also found to interact (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a; Tsakiris et al., 
2006). In the current results, even though agency was not abolished completely whilst 
viewing the hand from 180º (median score of 2 in the active condition) it was 
significantly lower compared to direct view. This finding supports that previously 
described by Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) who interpreted the effect as representing a 
difference between body agency and non-body agency, such that feelings of agency 
are stronger when it is your own body moving as opposed to an external object under 
one’s control. Unfortunately, we did not include a non-hand control condition in our 
design, so we cannot rule out the possibility that a sense of agency might also be 
experienced when a non-hand object moves in synchrony with one’s motor intentions. 
Future studies should therefore also examine agency over a non-body object seen in 
the mirror in order to clarify the relationship between body and non-body (i.e. 
external) agency. 
Importantly, our results did show enhanced agency during mirror view 
(compared to 180º). If, as suggested by the ownership results, mirror view produces 
feelings that the seen hand is part of the body, enhanced agency in mirror view 
compared to 180º may also reflect body agency. Therefore, mirror modulation of 
agency may also be driven at least in part by ownership. Indeed post hoc correlations 
(Spearman’s rho) between agency and ownership (synchronous – asynchronous 
scores) in the active conditions reveal the two to be strongly related for both direct (r2 
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= .58, p = .001) and mirror (r2 =.58, p <.001) view, but not 180º (r2 = .35, p = .047) 
(critical alpha = .017 following Bonferroni correction).  Therefore, these novel 
findings provide further support for the interactive nature of agency and ownership, 
and may suggest that the beneficial effects of mirror observation on agency related 
disorders, such as anosognsosia for hemiplegia, might work in part via their 
interaction with body ownership mechanisms. This helps to explain why mirrors 
appear to be more effective in treating ownership disorders such as 
somatoparaphrenia, while having a seemingly less dramatic and enduring effect on 
agency-related conditions (Fotopoulou, personal communication); however, further 
neuropsychological studies with robust assessment of ownership and agency during 
mirror self-observation are needed to further substantiate this idea. 
 Finally, results from the current study also provide evidence for an enhancing 
effect of efference signals on the experience of ownership, for both direct and mirror 
view. Significantly higher scores were found for active compared to passive 
movements in the ownership questionnaire responses as well as proprioceptive 
(height) drift. This is contrary the findings of Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) who, 
despite finding differences in subjective reports of ownership, found statistically 
equivalent proprioceptive drift with both active and passive movements. Interestingly, 
for the current results there was also no significant effect of synchrony on passive 
movements, suggesting that passive movements failed to cause remapping of the 
perceived hand location. Although proprioceptive drift is a widely used objective 
measure of the illusion, it does not always correspond with subjective feelings of 
ownership (Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, & Ward, 2011; Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 
2011) possibly accounting for inconsistent results in the literature. Similarly the effect 
of active vs. passive movement on the illusion is also found to be inconsistent 
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(Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a; 
Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011). One of the key differences between the 
current paradigm and that described by Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) is the trial 
duration, lasting for 90s in the original study and only 60s in the current study. It may 
be that although passive movement can elicit equivalently strong illusions as active 
movements, it may take longer to do so. Although 60s is a more than sufficient 
duration to elicit strong feelings of ownership, it may be that remapping of perceived 
hand location takes longer to establish and longer still when the movements are 
passive. Future studies should investigate perceived hand location and illusion 
strength at different time points during illusion induction and whether this is 
modulated by mirror view. 
 In conclusion, our findings contribute to the rich body of existing literature, 
which aims to understand how humans (Amsterdam, 1972) and other animals (Gallup, 
1970; Plotnik et al., 2006; and Reiss & Marino, 2001) recognise and relate to 
themselves in the mirror (see also Rochat & Zahavi, 2011, for a critical reappraisal of 
the mirror self-recognition literature). The current results demonstrate that both direct 
and mirror visual feedback of a model hand elicit strong feelings of ownership and 
agency (during active movement). In fact, seeing the hand in a mirror leads to 
ownership ratings that exceed those arising from directly viewing the hand, 
suggesting an enhancement of body ownership above typical levels. These results 
suggest that when a body part is viewed in a mirror, it is treated in a similar way to 
viewing the body directly. Moreover, the reflection in the mirror, despite providing an 
objectified view of the body ‘from the outside’ (rotated by 180°), is processed as part 
of the self and distinct from a visually identical external object. Therefore, the current 
study supports the notion that bodies viewed in mirrors are treated in a special way, 
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perceived as positioned within peripersonal space (self), and that this extends to both 
action (agency) as well as perception (ownership). 
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Figure 1. The experimental setup, showing the model hand (panel A), side view of the 
box with the right model hand on top and real hand inside (panel B), and overall 
arrangement of apparatus (panel C). During direct view conditions the model right 
hand was placed on top of the box. During mirror view conditions a mirror was 
placed immediately in front of the model hand and positioned such that only the 
reflection of the model hand could be seen. During 180º view conditions a model left 
hand was placed in the same location as the specular image created by the model right 
hand. 
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Figure 2. Main effect of Movement Type (left panels) and View (right panels) for 
ownership ratings (top panels) and proprioceptive drift (bottom panels). Thick black 
lines indicate the median. The box indicates the interquartile range, and the whiskers 
indicate the range. 
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Figure 3. Main effect of Movement Type (panel A), View (panel B), and Movement 
Type x View interaction (panel C) for agency ratings. Thick black lines indicate the 
median. The box indicates the interquartile range, and the whiskers indicate the range. 
